Middle East: From regional war to global conflict?

Should we be worried that the current situation in the Middle East can lead not only to the wider regional war but also to global conflict? Do you think that Russia/China might be willing to clash with the US/the West over Iran? Read a few comments. If you enjoy what I do, please support me on Ko-fi! Thank you.

Sean Foley, Professor, Department of History, Middle Tennessee State University

Nobody in the region or in the wider global community wants a world war or even an extended direct confrontation between Iran and Israel. That is why Iran and the United States—nations that disagree on many other matters – have cooperated closely to avoid a regional war since Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7. ​The US has used extensive diplomacy in Lebanon to prevent escalating conflict between Iran-allied Hezbollah and Israel in Southern Lebanon and refrained from attacking Iranian assets, even while attacking the Iranian-allied Houthis in Yemen.

The attack on Saturday was designed to prevent a wider conflict: Iran telegraphed its intentions to Israel with more than enough time for Israel and its allies to prepare for the attack. The initial weapons used were slow drones that were easily tracked. During the attack, Iranian diplomats at the UN in New York stated that the attack ended the crisis over the bombing of Iran’s diplomatic facility in Damascus. For its part, the US signaled that its assistance to Israel was defensive, that it would not aid Israel in an attack on Iran, and President Biden, in a phone call after the attack with PM Netanyahu, noted: (a) Israel had “proved itself” against its foes by shooting down Iranian drones/missiles and (b) that Biden and other Western leaders would lead a united “diplomatic” response to Iran’s attack.

To date, Israeli leaders have headed Biden’s words. Furthermore, none of the US allies in the region want a wider war and for good reason: It could threaten vital air and sea routes, already under strain because of the war in Gaza, and could, in theory, draw in other larger powers. China and Russia both have close strategic ties to Iran, with Iran providing valuable drones to Russia for its war in Ukraine. Any attack on Iranian soil could draw in one or both of those powers.

Jamsheed Choksy, Distinguished Professor, Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University Bloomington

Jerusalem’s surprise precision bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1 inflicted tangible personnel damage to the Islamic Republic’s military leadership especially impacting Quds Force activities within Syria and Tehran’s power projections into Lebanon and Israel. Iran’s response, while several hundred times greater in terms of firepower, was seemingly deliberately neither unexpected nor effective. Iran informed its neighbors 72 hours before drone and missile salvos were launched on April 14. The advance warning plus time between launch and possible impact ensured that Israeli forces together with American, British, and French military assets in the region would intercept and render ineffective Iran’s weapons. Additionally, Iran largely targeted Israeli military sites. The result of “Operation Truthful Promise,” though hailed as a “clean victory” by Iran’s official press, was mainly a show of light, sound, and fury—essentially a failed display of Tehran’s military capabilities—with one unfortunate Arab-Israeli civilian causality and limited tactical damage to Israel’s assets.

While chastising Washington and America’s partners for defending Israel, neither Russia nor China have joined Iran in threatening Israel with renewed military attacks even if Jerusalem retaliates for Tehran’s barrage of April 14. Vladimir Putin’s and Xi Jinping’s regimes do not fault Tehran; they accept the claim from Iran that the attack on April 14 was made within the right to self-defense. Nonetheless, Beijing expressed its “deep concern over the current escalation,” calling on “relevant parties to exercise calm and restraint to prevent further escalations.” Moscow too noted its “extreme concern over another dangerous escalation in the region,” reminding “all parties involved to exercise restraint.” So, it is unlikely that Russia and China will join Iran directly or indirectly in any subsequent military attacks on Israel or on American and European forces in the Middle East.

Nor does it seem that the back and forth conflict between Tehran and Jerusalem will draw in nations of the Middle East other than for Iran’s partners like the Assad regime of Syria, Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas who are already involved. Indeed, actions by the Jordanian, Saudi, and Emirati regimes in mitigating the impact of the Iranian strike attempt on Israel show not only those Arab kingdoms pushing back against intrusions into their airspaces but also how closely Sunni royals have allied their nations’ futures and their own hold on power with the USA, Europe, and Israel.

Jeff VanDenBerg, Chair, Political Science and International Affairs, Director of Middle East Studies, Drury University

In the short to medium term, it is very unlikely that the situation in the Middle East will lead to direct great power conflict. Although Russia and Iran have moved into closer alliance in recent years (in drone military production/transfers, for example), Russia is too burdened with its war of aggression in Ukraine to risk broader engagements.  China’s interests are to prevent Middle East conflict from spreading rather than fomenting it.

On the other hand, all sides are engaging in multi-level calculations at this tense moment.  From the US perspective, restraining Israel’s response to the 13 April Iranian attacks (and seeking a pause in Gaza) is in part based on concern over the potential for conflict escalation. For example, if Israel were to launch massive strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities or weapons production plants, Russian interests would certainly be in play.